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Secret letter on fascist-rebel, espionage, sabotage, subversive, defeatist, and terrorist activities of Polish intelligence in the USSR

 

 

 

August 11 1937

 

People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD) of the USSR

MAIN DIRECTORATE OF STATE SECURITY

TOP SECRET

To be kept on par with the code

Copy No. ___

SECRET LETTER

on the fascist-rebel, espionage, sabotage, subversive, defeatist, and terrorist activities of Polish intelligence in the USSR

No. 59098

August 11 1937

Moscow

 

 

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

TO THE PEOPLE’S COMMISSARS OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE UNION REPUBLICS, AND HEADS OF NKVD DEPARTMENTS IN AUTONOMOUS REPUBLICS, REGIONS, AND TERRITORIES.

 

The NKVD of the Union has uncovered and is liquidating the largest and, according to all available information, the primary subversive spy network of Polish intelligence in the USSR, which existed in the form of the so-called “Polish Military Organization”.[1]

Prior to the October Revolution and immediately thereafter, PIŁSUDSKI[2] created his largest political agency on Soviet territory, which was previously leading the now-liquidated organization. Year after year, he systematically transferred numerous cadres of spies and saboteurs into the USSR, disguising them as political emigrants, political prisoners meant for exchange, and defectors. These individuals became part of the overall organization’s system operating in the USSR and were supplemented by recruitment of the local Polish population.

The organization was led from headquarters located in Moscow and included individuals such as UNŠLICHT,[3] MUKLEVIČ,[4] OLSKIJ,[5] and others. It had significant branches in Belarus and Ukraine, primarily in the border regions and various other areas of the Soviet Union.

At present, while primarily only the leadership and active members of the organization have been eliminated, it has been determined that the organization’s anti-Soviet activities extend to the following entities: the People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD), the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army (RKKA), the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army,[6] and the apparatus of the Communist International (ComIntern). The last of these primarily included the Polish section of the ComIntern Executive Committee (IKKI), the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs (NarKomInDel), the defense industry, transportation, including the strategic routes of the Western Front, and agriculture.

The organization’s anti-Soviet work encompassed the following:

Collaborative efforts with left-wing Socialist-Revolutionaries and followers of Bucharin[7] to prepare to overthrow the Soviet government, disrupt the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, provoke a war between the RSFSR and Germany, and assemble armed intervention units (1916).

Widespread and comprehensive subversive activities on the Western and Southwestern fronts during the Soviet-Polish War, with the expressed intention of defeating the Red Army and causing the cessation of Ukraine and Belarus.

Mass fascist-nationalist propaganda among the Polish population in the USSR in order to establish a base and recruit local personnel for subversive, espionage, and insurgent actions.

Skillful espionage work within the military, economic, and political spheres of Soviet life, involving a significant strategic agent network and a broad middle- and lower-level espionage network.

Sabotage and subversion activities in major sectors of the defense industry within current and mobilization planning, transportation, and national economy. Creation of a powerful sabotage network for wartime, consisting of both Poles and, to a significant degree, various non-Polish citizens.

Contacts and collaboration between subversive, espionage, and other active anti-Soviet actions and the Trotskyist[8] center and its periphery, with the organization of right-wing traitors, and with Belarusian and Ukrainian nationalists for the purpose of joint groundwork to overthrow Soviet power and partition the USSR.

Direct contact and agreement with the leader of the military-fascist conspiracy, the traitor TUKHACHEVSKIJ,[9] with the intention of disrupting the preparation of the Red Army for war, and opening our front to the Poles during the war.

Deep infiltration of organization members into the Communist Party of Poland, complete takeover of the leading party organs and the Polish section of the Executive Committee of ComIntern (IKKI). Provocative work aimed at undermining and demoralizing the party, disrupting the unity of the popular front in Poland, and using party channels to let spies and saboteurs infiltrate the USSR. Work aimed at turning the Communist Party into an appendage of Piłsudski’s Poland with the purpose of using its influence for anti-Soviet actions during Poland’s military attack on the USSR.

             The complete takeover and paralysis of all our intelligence efforts against Poland; the systematic infiltration of organization members into VChK – OGPU – NKVD and RazvedUpr RKKA for active anti-Soviet work.

 

The main reason for the organization’s unpunished anti-Soviet activities in the last almost 20 years has been the fact that, from the very start, some leading Polish spies, including UNŠLICHT, MESSING,[10] PILAR,[11] MEDVEDʹ,[12] OLSKIJ, SOSNOVSKIJ,[13] MAKOVSKIJ,[14] LOGANOVSKIJ,[15] BARANSKIJ[16] and others, had infiltrated major sectors of anti-Polish work within the VChK. They had taken complete control of all the anti-Polish intelligence and counterintelligence work of the VChK – OGPU – NKVD.

THE EMERGENCE OF THE ORGANIZATION AND METHODS OF INFILTRATING POLISH AGENTS INTO THE USSR

 

The Polish Military Organization was established in 1914 at the initiative and under the personal leadership of JÓZEF PIŁSUDSKI as a nationalist organization consisting of active supporters of the struggle for the independence of bourgeois Poland. Its members were well trained in the military organizations of the Polish Socialist Party, which was primarily supported by PIŁSUDSKI, as well as in special military schools that he established to prepare the core of the future Polish army.

These schools were established by PIŁSUDSKI between 1910 and 1914 in Galicia. They operated semi-secretly and received subsidies and practical assistance from the intelligence department of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff. Even before the outbreak of the imperialist war,[17] PIŁSUDSKI had at his disposal a number of officers from the Austro-Hungarian intelligence service. These officers trained PIŁSUDSKI’s supporters in military affairs, as well as reconnaissance and sabotage techniques. These cadres, formed a little later than POW, were intended for actions in alliance with the Austro-German army at the rear of Russian troops, as well as for recruitment by Polish legions in anticipation of war with tsarist Russia.

Therefore, even back then, the members of POW were not only in Poland; they were also sent to Russia and recruited on the spot, creating their organizations wherever possible, primarily in major cities, with the aim of registration and mobilization of their people for communication and intelligence purposes.

At the same time, POW served as a tool for the political mobilization of forces led by PIŁSUDSKI in the struggle for Polish independence. This is how POW secretly infiltrated all Polish political parties, from the far left to the far right, recruiting active members of these parties into its ranks based on recognition of the unquestionable authority and personal will of PIŁSUDSKI, as well as the idea of reestablishing Poland as a great power within the borders of 1772.[18]

Using this strategy, POW accumulated valuable experience in regards to inner-party and cross-party provocations, making the latter its main method of struggle against the revolutionary movement.

At that time, POW was led by the Central Staff (Komenda naczelna; KN), which directed the activities of the local organizations of PIŁSUDSKI’s supporters. These organizations would receive the same name, with the addition of an ordinal number; for example, in Belarus it would be KN-1, while in Ukraine – KN-3, and so on. Each of these local Komenda represented a regional territorial district of POW, divided into the local POW commandant’s offices. The number of commandant’s offices in each district depended on the local conditions and tasks pursued by PIŁSUDSKI in any given region.

In late 1918, with the formation of Poland, led by PIŁSUDSKI (the ultimate dictator carrying the title of the “head of state”), the main command of POW was incorporated in its entirety into the General Staff of Poland, forming the intelligence department of the Staff.

During the period of PIŁSUDSKI’s temporary removal from power in Poland (1922–1926), the chief command of POW (which, for the most part, was excluded from the government by the endeks[19] but managed to partially preserve its influence within the intelligence department of the General Staff) continued its subversive and intelligence work on the territory of the USSR independently of the official agencies, getting ready for PIŁSUDSKI’s return to power.

After the so-called May Coup of 1926, after which PIŁSUDSKI was back in power, POW leadership and its activists filled the entire upper echelon of the state and the fascist government apparatus of Poland. A significant number of POW activists remained underground to combat the revolutionary movement in Poland via provocations and political incitement, as well as to illegally infiltrate the USSR.

The activities of PIŁSUDSKI’s clandestine organization on our territory increased substantially in 1917, when, due to the events of the imperialist war, a significant number of PIŁSUDSKI’s qualified associates from the milieu of legionnaires (PIŁSUDSKI’s legions were formed by POW as part of the Austro-Hungarian Army) and refugees from the territory of tsarist Poland, which was then occupied by the Germans, gathered in various parts of our country.

Thus, by the time of the October Revolution, PIŁSUDSKI had accumulated significant POW personnel in Russia, from both the local Polish population and Poles evacuated from Poland.

However, the main personnel of POW during the imperialist war consisted of individuals known for their openly patriotic Polish convictions. Moreover, given the triumphant rise of the Bolshevik Party, in the summer of 1917 PIŁSUDSKI took special recruitment measures to infiltrate the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party (Bolsheviks) (RSDRP[b]).At PIŁSUDSKI’s personal directive, his close associates launched extensive recruitment efforts among Polish social democrats and the left-wing of the Polish Socialist Party. Both these parties later merged and formed the Communist Party of Poland.

Throughout 1917, members of POW’s central leadership, who were then in Moscow and Petrograd – PRYSTOR[20] (subsequently, ­Polish Prime Minister), PUŻAK[21] (Secretary of the Central Committee of PPS), MAKOVSKIJ (member of the Moscow Committee of PPS, subsequently the Deputy Head of the Foreign Department of OGPU, resident agent in Poland), GOLOWKO,[22] JÓZEWSKI[23] (Volhynian voivode), and MATUSZEWSKI[24] (subsequently, the Chief of the Second Department of the Polish General Staff, or PGŠ) – involved a number of Polish social democrats and members of the left-wing of PPS, who later infiltrated prominent positions within the Soviet government apparatus: UNŠLICHT (former Deputy Chairman of RVS OGPU[25]), LEŠINSKIJ[26] (Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Poland), DOLECKIJ[27] (Head of TASS), BRONKOWSKI[28] (Deputy Chief of the Intelligence ­Directorate of the Red Army, RazvedUpr RKKA), MUKLEVIČ (Head of the Naval Forces of the Red Army, Deputy People’s Commissar for Defense), LONGVA[29] (Corps Commander, KomKor; Commander of the Red Army Communications Directorate), and several others. In 1918, they formed the Moscow POW center and took over leadership of all POW activities on the territory of the USSR.

Concurrently, in early 1918, PIŁSUDSKI provided certain directives to a selected group of POW members who were part of PPS and were based in the USSR. They were instructed to infiltrate the Soviet government apparatus by staging a split from PPS and adopting a Soviet party line. Those who infiltrated the Soviet system were former member of the Moscow Committee of the PPS, M. LOGANOVSKIJ (who, prior to his arrest, was the Deputy People’s Commissar of Food Industry), MAKOVSKIJ, VOJTYGA[30] (the three of them infiltrated the Counter-Intelligence Department of VChKa – OGPU – NKVD), BARANSKIJ (Head of the Foreign Department of OGPU – NKVD), and several others.

In 1919–1920 and later, while striving to gain control of our intelligence and counterintelligence efforts against Poland, alongside infiltrating the aforementioned POW members into the Soviet security apparatus, PIŁSUDSKI took a series of measures to infiltrate highly skilled intelligence officers, specifically officers of the Second Department of the Polish General Staff, into the Soviet security and counterintelligence. With the assistance of UNŠLICHT, MESSING, PILAR, MEDVEDʹ and other prominent Polish agents, they assumed leadership positions within Soviet intelligence and counterintelligence. For example, IGNACIJ SOSNOVSKIJ (before his arrest, Deputy Head of the NKVD Administration for the Saratov Region), who acted as PIŁSUDSKI’s emissary in 1919, as well as the emissary of the resident agents of the Second Department of the PGŠ on Soviet territory, received a directive from Major MATUSZEWSKI, the Head of the Second Department, to infiltrate the VChK apparatus.In the summer of 1920, using his arrest by the Special Department of the VChK, SOSNOVSKIJ, the leading member of the Polish intelligence services, staged his split from POW with the assistance of PILAR. He was allowed by the Second Department of the Polish General Staff (PGŠ) to disclose only a negligible part of his network and managed to infiltrate the central apparatus of VChK. Shortly thereafter, SOSNOVSKIJ successfully infiltrated an entire group of high-ranking Polish intelligence officers into VChK. The group included Lieutenant Colonel of the Second Department of PGŠ VITKOVSKIJ[31] (he was Head of the Polish section of the Special Department of VChK, before moving on to work at the People’s Commissariat of Heavy Industry), KIJAKOVSKIJ[32] (Head of the English and Romance Languages Department of the Counter-Intelligence of VChK), ROLLER[33] (prior to his arrest, Head of the Special Department of the Stalingrad region), BŽOZOVSKIJ[34] (Deputy Head of the Special ­Department for Ukraine), and others.

Several other members of POW, such as BRONKOWSKI, the Deputy Head of RazvedUpr RKKA, with the assistance of UNŠLICHT, seized control of the entire RazvedUpr system, paralyzing all intelligence work against Poland. Other such members included BUDKIEVIČ[35] (Head of the Department and foreign resident agent), ŽBIKOVSKIJ,[36] ŠERINSKIJ,[37] FIRIN,[38] JODLOVSKIJ,[39] UZDANSKIJ,[40] MAKSIMOV.[41]

One of the ways these prominent Polish spies were utilized in foreign operations by the Foreign Department (INO) and RazvedUpr was through extensive use of doppelgangers within our resident offices abroad. Subsequently, these doppelgangers, planted by the intelligence services, were transferred to the USSR for espionage and sabotage activities via the system of staged failures.

At various times, the following Polish agents infiltrated and worked in leadership positions within the Red Army: UNŠLICHT, Deputy Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council (RVS); MUKLEVIČ, Head of the Navy; LONGVA, Head of the Communications Department of the Red Army (RKKA), KOCHANSKIJ,[42] Corps Commander (KomKor); KOZLOVSKIJ,[43] Commissar of various units, and many other Polish agents who infiltrated a number of departments of RKKA.

The main cadre of Polish agents who infiltrated the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs (NarKomInDel) was created by LOGANOVSKIJ, who worked there from 1925 to 1931. Here, too, Polish intelligence concentrated on the section of NarkomInDel’s work related to Poland (the Polish section was handled by spies MORŠTYN[44] and KONIC[45]) and several other important directions (plenipotentiaries BRODOVSKIJ,[46] GAIKIS,[47] KARSKIJ[48]).

Having long taken control of the leading agencies of the Polish Communist Party and the Polish section of ComIntern (IKKI), POW systematically transferred its members – spies and saboteurs – to the USSR under the guise of political emigrants and prisoners that had to be exchanged, deliberately staging the arrests and convictions of POW members who had infiltrated the Communist Party.

Regardless of POW, the method of transferring spies to the USSR under the guise of political emigrants was widely used by the Polish political police (defensywa), which had a significant number of operatives within the ranks of revolutionary organizations from Polish, Belarusian, and Ukrainian nationalist circles in Poland, Western Ukraine, and Western Belarus.

Concurrently, various Polish Intelligence agencies (primarily, local units of the Second Polish General Staff – Wilno[49] and Lwów[50] ekspozytura,[51] border reconnaissance points or placówki wywiadu, the political police in the rear and border regions of Poland) sent spies and saboteurs to the USSR under the guise of defectors. This was carried out systematically and on a grand scale.

These “defectors” concealed their criminal objectives of coming to the USSR under various motives and pretexts (desertion from the military; fleeing from police persecution and unemployment; looking for work, reuniting with family, etc.).

As has by now become evident, in some cases, despite having their own independent communication channels with Poland, Polish spies and saboteurs who had been sent to the USSR under the guise of defectors made contact with members of POW on our territory and acted under their guidance. In general, the majority of defectors served as a source of active personnel for the organization.

Several qualified Polish spies sent to the USSR as defectors – specifically, soldiers who had deserted from the Polish army – settled in the Saratov region, where Polish agents PILAR and SOSNOVSKIJ had operated.

Political emigrants and defectors formed the backbone of the Polish sabotage network within industry and transportation, recruiting sabotage personnel from among local Polish nationalists and, most importantly, from various non-Polish, deeply conspiratorial anti-Soviet elements.

The organization of POW in Ukraine was headed by LAZOVERT[52] (State Arbitrator of the Ukrainian SSR), who led the partially liquidated center of POW in Ukraine (SKARBEK,[53] POLITUR,[54] WISZNIEWSKI[55]). In Belarus, POW was led by BENEK[56] (People’s Commissar for Land of the Belarusian SSR), who, like LAZOVERT, had been a member of the Moscow POW center since 1918.

THE LEAD-UP TO THE ANTI-SOVIET COUP DURING THE FIRST PERIOD OF THE REVOLUTION

 

During the early period of the Russian Revolution, there were efforts to organize an anti-Soviet coup. They included actions aimed at undermining the Brest-Litovsk Treaty and preparing for an anti-Soviet uprising in collaboration with the followers of Bucharin, as well as left-wing Esers.[57] The goal was to encourage Soviet Russia to continue its war against Germany. By that time, PIŁSUDSKI had already shifted his focus towards the Entente powers and was managing the activities of his organizations according to the directives of the French Staff.

Members of this organization, including individuals like UNŠLICHT, LEŠINSKIJ, and DOLECKIJ, along with BUCHARIN[58] and the Esers, developed a plan to arrest members of the Council of People’s Commissars (SovNarKom), including LENIN. To execute this plan, individuals like PESTKOVSKIJ[59] established contact with the French intelligence representative in Moscow, General LAVERGNE,[60] and worked with the Eser leadership. BOBINSKIJ[61] amassed armed detachments to participate in the left-wing Social Revolutionary uprisings. Additionally, efforts were made to prepare provocative military actions against the German forces on the demarcation line using Polish units that had survived since KERENSKIJ’s time.

Despite the efforts, the plan for an anti-Soviet coup and continuation of war with Germany did not succeed. Subsequently, the Moscow branch of POW followed the directives provided by LAVERGNE, as well as those of PIŁSUDSKI’s aide-de-camp, as well as WIENIAWA-DŁUGOSZOWSKI,[62] an important member of POW who had arrived on Soviet territory illegally. As a result, the organization shifted its focus to making preparations for the intervention against Soviet Russia. These Polish activists and revolutionaries accomplished this goal by creating their own armed forces under the guise of forming Polish units within the Red Army.

The so-called Western Rifle Division that was formed in late 1918 and included, for the most part, Polish soldiers, had its entire command structure taken over by members of POW (division commanders MAKOVSKIJ[63] and LONGVA; commissars LAZOVERT and SLAVINSKIJ;[64] brigade commanders MAJEVSKIJ[65] and DLUSSKIJ[66]; brigade commissars SCIBOR,[67] GRUZEL[68] and ČERNICKIJ[69]). Regimental commanders within the Division were also members of POW. These members formed POW groups within various units of the Division.

 

 

DEFEATIST ACTIVITY DURING THE SOVIET-POLISH WAR

 

In early 1919, the Western Front became the primary theater of operation for the Moscow branch of POW. Utilizing the presence of some of its members in leadership positions within the Front’s headquarters (UNŠLICHT, a member of the Revolutionary Military Council, or RVS; MUKLEWICZ, the Commissar of the Front’s headquarters; STAŠEVSKIJ,[70] Head of the Intelligence Department of the Front’s headquarters; BUDKEVIČ,[71] Commissar of the Sixteenth Army’s headquarters; MEDVEDʹ, OLSKIJ, POLIČKEVIČ,[72] ČACKIJ[73]) in the Belarusian government (CICHOVSKIJ,[74] Chairman of the All-Belarusian Central Executive Committee, or TsIK, of the Lithuanian-Belarusian Republic), the organization extensively engaged in activities aimed at defeating the Red Army and aiding the Polish capture of Belarus.

The organization’s first major operation on the frontlines led to the surrender of Wilno to the Poles, orchestrated by UNŠLICHT, who had taken control of the defense of the Lithuanian-Belarusian Republic.[75]

Throughout various parts of the Western Front, the organization concentrated a significant number of its supporters, gathering them from different regions of the country under the guise of mobilizing Polish “communists” for the front. They infiltrated various Soviet institutions within the front and assumed leadership of the local POW in Belarus (“KN-1”), which had been established by the Poles independently of the Moscow center.

Subsequently, during the entire Soviet-Polish war and under UNŠLICHT’s leadership, the organization not only provided the Polish command with crucial information about the plans and actions of our army on the Western Front (UNŠLICHT communicated the plan of attack on Warsaw to the Poles), but also carried out a systematic effort to influence the front’s operational plans in a direction favorable to the Poles. POW also initiated extensive sabotage and insurgency work in the rear of the Western Front.

In light of the facts established by the current investigation, there is no doubt that the disbanded POW organization, led by UNŠLICHT, played a significant role in thwarting the Red Army’s advance on Warsaw.

 

 

FASCIST NATIONALIST ACTIVITY AMONG THE POLISH POPULATION IN THE USSR

 

During the Civil War, alongside active sabotage and insurgent activities, locally established POW entities, independent of the Moscow center, conducted extensive nationalist work among the local Polish population in Belarus (“KN-1”), Ukraine (“KN-3”), Siberia, and other regions.

After the conclusion of the Soviet-Polish War, local POW organizations adapted to the conditions of peacetime. The overall coordination of their anti-Soviet activities shifted to the POW center in Moscow, which continued to conduct a widespread, ongoing fascist-nationalist campaign among the Polish population of the USSR.

Especially active from the late 1920s onward was the broad infiltration of Polish agents into key positions within the entire system of the Soviet party institutions responsible for working with the Polish population of the USSR. This system was then used to carry out the work of “POW”.

Members of POW, HELTMAN[76] and NEJMAN,[77] infiltrated positions as secretaries of the Politburo TsK VKP(b). VNOROVSKIJ,[78] ­VONSOVSKIJ,[79] and MAZEPUS[80] assumed roles in the Politburo TsK VKP(b) of Belarus. SKARBEK, LAZOVERT, and others did the same within the Politburo TsK VKP(b) of Ukraine. DOMBALʹ[81] served as the editor of Trybuna Radziecka in Moscow, while PRINZ[82] and ŽARSKIJ[83] worked as editors of Polish newspapers in Minsk. Other members of POW took control of the editorial positions in Polish newspapers in Ukraine, as well as Polish sections of the People’s Commissariats of Education (NarKomPros), Polish publishing houses, technical colleges, schools, and clubs in various regions of the USSR.

Utilizing their official positions and their authority to allocate personnel, HELTMAN and NEJMAN dispatched members of POW from Moscow. These members concealed their affiliations behind their party membership cards to engage in party, cultural, educational, and economic work in various regions of the USSR where Polish populations resided. They were not limited to Ukraine, Belarus, and Leningrad but were also sent to the Urals, Siberia, and the Far East, where Polish intelligence carried out active, hitherto undiscovered operations in collaboration with Japanese intelligence.

The organization actively exploited its infiltration into the system of Soviet party institutions to create local grassroots POW groups and expand its extensive chauvinistic and Polonization efforts that continue to this day. The primary objective remains the preparation of diversionary and insurgent personnel for potential armed anti-Soviet actions in the event of war.

These same objectives were pursued through the establishment – under the influence of POW – of Polish national rural councils and districts in border regions, often in areas with minority Polish populations. This also provided POW with an opportunity for Polonization efforts among Ukrainians and Belarusians-Catholics.

The organization extensively leveraged its penetration into the system of the Soviet party institutions working with the Polish population to conduct comprehensive espionage activities through its extensive agent network across various regions of the country.

 

 

UTILIZATION OF TROTSKYISTS AND OTHER ANTI-SOVIET ORGANIZATIONS BY POLISH INTELLIGENCE

 

In its practical subversive, espionage, terrorist, and sabotage activities within the territory of the USSR, Polish intelligence extensively relies on Trotskyite agents and right-wing traitors.

In 1931, UNŠLICHT and MUKLEVIČ, having established connections with the anti-Soviet Trotskyite center represented by PIATAKOV[84] and later with KAMENEV,[85] reached an agreement with them on conducting joint subversive and destructive activities. Together with members of POW and Trotskyite-Zinovievite[86] elements, they aimed to undermine the country’s national economy, particularly within the military industry.

In September 1932, UNŠLICHT also established contact with the right-wing traitors and received approval from BUCHARIN for the collaboration between the right-wing elements and POW in their subversive activities.

Finally, in 1933 with PIATAKOV’s consent, UNŠLICHT established contact with the traitor TUKHACHEVSKIJ, obtaining information about his dealings with the German fascists. They reached an agreement to jointly work towards the liquidation of Soviet power and the restoration of capitalism in the USSR. UNŠLICHT negotiated with TUKHACHEVSKIJ to provide crucial espionage information to Polish intelligence regarding the Red Army (RKKA) and to make the Soviet Western Front accessible to the Poles in the event of war.

All local POW organizations conducted anti-Soviet activities in close coordination with Trotskyites, right-wing elements, and various anti-Soviet nationalist organizations in Ukraine, Belarus, and other regions.

POLISH ESPIONAGE IN THE USSR

Regardless of the activities of its lower-level espionage network, up until its liquidation the Moscow POW center systematically provided Polish intelligence with crucial information about the military, economic, and political situation in the USSR. This included operational and mobilization materials from the Red Army General Staff, to which UNŠLICHT, MUKLEVIČ, BUDKEVIČ, BRONKOWSKI, LONGVA, and other members of the Moscow center had access through their official positions.

Concurrently, the Moscow POW center and resident agents of the Second Department of PGŠ[87] conducted extensive recruitment of spies among non-Polish elements. For example, in 1932 UNŠLICHT successfully recruited the Head of the RKKA Artillery Directorate, IEFIMOV,[88] and obtained from him comprehensive information about the state of the artillery armaments in the Red Army. Another member of the Moscow POW center, PESTKOVSKIJ, carried out several recruitments within ComIntern, scientific institutes, and other organizations, mainly recruiting non-Polish agents directly for Polish intelligence and, only in some cases, for POW. The Warsaw center occasionally authorized the inclusion of non-Polish elements (Russians or Ukrainians) in POW. LOGANOVSKIJ created a significant espionage network within the NarKomInDel.

SOSNOVSKIJ, resident agent of the Second Department of the PGŠ, and his Deputy Lieutenant Colonel VITKOVSKIJ conducted particularly extensive recruitment work.

For Polish intelligence, SOSNOVSKIJ successfully recruited Assistant Chief of the RKKA, KARIN,[89] who had been a German agent since 1916; Assistant Chief of the RazvedUpr RKKA, MEIER;[90] Assistant Prosecutor of the USSR, PRUSS;[91] Deputy Head of the Dmitrovskij Camp of NKVD, PUZICKIJ;[92] and several other individuals occupying high-level positions in RKKA – OGPU – NKVD and central government institutions.

WITKOWSKI, who had been infiltrated into VChK by SOSNOVSKIJ in 1920, was later transferred to work in transportation and held managerial positions within the national economy. By the time of his arrest, he had created a large subversive and espionage network, consisting primarily of highly qualified professionals.

The Red Army continued to be a significant channel of infiltration for Polish intelligence. This espionage network persisted until the present day. One notable entry point was the so-called Moscow School of the Red Communards, which existed from 1920 to 1927 (prior to its disbanding, it was known as the UNŠLICHT United Military School).

This military school, especially during its initial period of existence, was staffed with Poles who were sent there by the Polish Bureau attached to central and local party organizations. Members of POW who had infiltrated the Polish Bureau directed individuals (including those who were already within the organization, as well potential agents of Polish intelligence) to the Red Communards School. These potential agents often maintained their presence in the USSR by posing as captives who were unwilling to return to Poland after the Soviet–Polish War, or by presenting themselves as defectors. In the school itself, a strong POW group conducted its own recruitment efforts.

The School trained personnel for commanding positions in infantry, cavalry, and artillery specialties, and these people were sent to various parts of the Red Army; inevitably, among them there were Polish spies who had graduated from the School.

Communication with Warsaw was systematically maintained with the help of various methods. Prominent representatives of the Warsaw POW center, as well as those of the Second Department of PGŠ, regularly visited the USSR. They established contact with UNŠLICHT, PESTKOVSKIJ, SOSNOVSKIJ, VTKOVSKIJ, BORTNOVSKIJ, and others.

These representatives traveled to the USSR under various official pretexts (as diplomatic couriers, inspectors of Polish diplomatic missions, businessmen), under personal cover {as tourists, for family visits, transiting},[93] and even illegally. Specifically, to maintain regular contact with SOSNOVSKIJ and OLSKIJ, the personnel of the Polish military attaché in Moscow included KOWALSKI[94] and KOBYLAŃSKI[95] – officers of the PGŠ Second Department who were close to PIŁSUDSKI. These meetings were legalized by organizing fictitious recruitment of two officers for OGPU by OLSKIJ and SOSNOVSKIJ.

A number of organization members had covert contacts with the Polish military attaché in Moscow and other members of the embassy residency (WIŚLAK,[96] BUDKIEVYČ, DOMBALʹ, NAUISKAYTIS,[97] KONIC, and others).

Others members of POW who infiltrated positions that allowed them to officially meet the embassies’ staff used their locations for espionage and communication (LOGANOVSKIJ, at official receptions; MORŠTYN, at the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs or NKID; PESTKOVSKIJ, within various Polish-Soviet committees, etc.)

Members of the organization who were working abroad, in either official Soviet or undercover positions, established contacts with representatives of POW and the Second Department of PGŠ (LOGANOVSKIJ and BARANSKIJ in Warsaw; BORŽOZOVSKIJ[98] in Finland, Czechoslovakia, and Japan; LEŠINSKIJ in Copenhagen; BUDKIEVYČ in France, etc.).

Finally, several high-ranking resident agents (SOSNOVSKIJ and PESTKOVSKIJ) had complex codes and passwords for communication.

Through these communication channels, all the intelligence information, especially in regards to the activities of the organization, was systematically transmitted to Warsaw. In return, the main center of POW and the Second Department of PGŠ provided financial support and directives for the organization’s activities.

SABOTAGE AND SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES OF POLISH INTELLIGENCE WITHIN THE SOVIET NATIONAL ECONOMY

Following the end of the Civil War, Polish intelligence – through the Moscow POW center and other co-existing channels – began subversive activities initially aimed at disrupting the reconstruction of the Soviet industrial sector.

In 1925 during his visit to Moscow, a representative of the Warsaw POW center, M. SOKOLNICKI,[99] conveyed a directive to UNŠLICHT: the Moscow center had to intensify its subversive work. Shortly after, the directive was supplemented with instructions to transition to sabotage operations.

In accordance with these directives and up until its liquidation, the Moscow POW center carried out a wide range of sabotage and subversive activities aimed at undermining the defense capabilities of the USSR.

Prominent members of POW infiltrated the leadership of the Red Army (RKKA) and the Red Navy (RKKF), as well as civilian institutions responsible for defense matters (RKKA General Staff, the Directorate of Naval Forces, defense, transport, and metallurgy sectors of the State Planning Committee, or GosPlan of the USSR, the Main Directorate of Maritime Shipbuilding, or GlavMorProm, and others).

In 1925, the military-economic department of the mobilization management was formed at the RKKA headquarters. A POW member, S. BOTNER,[100] was infiltrated into this department’s top position. He participated in active espionage and the subversive GORBATIUK[101] group, which operated within the military-scientific sector.

Together with GORBATIUK, BOTNER conducted significant subversive work within the Mobilization Department of the RKKA headquarters, aimed at preparing for the defeat of the Soviet Union in the impending war.

For example, when working on mobilization issues, the group, by shifting the focus to rear support issues, intentionally reduced the army’s requests for wartime resources, claiming they were artificially inflated. The timelines for mobilizing the industrial sector were extended to a year or more, essentially leaving several enterprises unprepared for the defense. As for resolving issues related to supplying the Red Army with military equipment and improving its effectiveness, they were systematically delayed.

In 1927, the GosPlan Defense Sector was established. It was supposed to play a major role in the preparation of the country’s defense, industrial mobilization, and transport.

To seize control of this crucial sector, the Moscow center of POW infiltrated key positions in the Defense Sector of GosPlan. Initially, the center placed the abovementioned BOTNER in the leadership position within the sector. Later, with the assistance of BOTNER and UNŠLICHT, other members of POW, V. A. KOLESINSKIJ,[102] Anna MUKLEVIČ,[103] and Zaslaw ŠIRINSKIJ, infiltrated this sector. In 1931, UNŠLICHT, the Deputy Chairman of GosPlan, also became part of this infiltration. These individuals, in turn, engaged the leading employees of the Defense Sector in their organization.

In terms of its practical activities, POW’s primary goal was to undermine the development of the military-industrial complex.

Initially, POW members openly opposed the construction of military factories, arguing that it was too expensive and unaffordable. Subsequently, they subversively recommended that military production should be integrated with civilian industries.

To achieve this goal, UNŠLICHT, KOLESINSKIJ, BOTNER, and others aligned themselves with the anti-Soviet Trotskyist group headed by SMILGA[104] (the group was part of the Supreme Council of the National Economy, or VSNKh).

Consequently, moving away from risky, explicit opposition to military construction, the organization adopted more covert methods of undermining the Soviet defense base.

While working out the plans for the capital construction of the military-industrial complex, the members of the organization deliberately dispersed funds among various construction projects and failed to provide the necessary resources for projects of critical importance. As a result, the construction of military plants was prolonged, incompetence within individual workshops was fostered, and the practice of construction without proper plans was encouraged.

In this regard, the disruption of the construction and reconstruction of ammunition factories is particularly telling. This disruption, combined with other subversive actions, was intended to create an “ammunition famine” during wartime.

In some regions, such as the Urals, only munition factories were built, while ammunition factories were absent. This led and continues to lead to a situation in which the production of projectile bodies is located thousands of kilometers away from where they can be equipped. In cases when the construction of ammunition factories did take place, their development was intentionally slowed down, while the infrastructure supporting these factories (water, steam, energy, sewage) was disrupted.

The construction and reconstruction of projectile body production plants was intentionally disrupted as well. UNŠLICHT, KOLESINSKIJ, and BOTNER, in active cooperation with the Trotskyist organization within the industry (PIATAKOV, SMILGA, JERMAN,[105] KROŽEVSKIJ[106]), deliberately reduced the capacity of these plants, prolonging their construction and reconstruction.

 

A similar situation existed with the production of gunpowder. During the planning stage of the new gunpowder factories within the Defense Sector of GosPlan, UNŠLICHT, KOLESINSKIJ, and BOTNER adopted and implemented Ratajčak’s[107] subversive instructions, including calculations of capacity based on outdated norms. Concurrently, subversion was carried out to delay the construction of new facilities (e.g., the Aleksin Gunpowder Plant in the Moscow region), to disrupt the supporting infrastructure of gunpowder factories, and to sabotage the reconstruction of old gunpowder plants (Kazan Plant No. 40, Kosiakov Plant No. 14, etc.).

In terms of planning, POW intentionally underestimated consumption plans for metals for military orders and provided false and knowingly understated information about the production capacities of the defense industry, arguing that the procurement plans of the Military Commissariat (VoienVed) for the defense industry were unachievable. The mobilization orders from the VoienVed and the People’s Commissariat of Communication Routes (NKPS) were reduced drastically, resulting in year-to-year underperformance of the defense construction programs and shortages in mobilization reserves.

Plans for providing mobilized industry with labor were abandoned for several years.

Despite the deficit in supplying military production with non-ferrous metals during wartime, measures to replace non-ferrous metals were deliberately delayed, just like the development of the rare-metal industries.

Certain areas of mobilization preparation within the Defense Sector of GosPlan were intentionally neglected, particularly in the fields of healthcare and agriculture.

Specifically, UNŠLICHT, with the help of the Trotskyist JEMŠANOV,[108] whom he recruited, conducted significant subversive work within the transportation sector of GosPlan.

These subversive actions were aimed at disrupting the delivery of raw materials for factories and impeding the export of finished goods. This result was achieved by intentionally lowering the norms and indicators. Necessary repairs to transportation were consistently delayed by decreasing NKPS requests for metal. The elimination of areas of congestion was artificially slowed down through subversive allocation of funds when approving capital construction projects within the transportation industry.

For an extended period, the plan for mobilization transportation along railway routes was drafted in such a way that economic transportation would almost entirely cease upon the outbreak of war. This would have meant a disruption of industrial mobilization and ordinary life in the rear of the country.

One of the leaders of POW, R. A. MUKLEVIČ, carried out serious subversive and diversionary work within the framework of the Naval Fleet and the Main Directorate of GlavMorProm.

From the moment of his appointment as the Chief of the Workers and Peasants’ Red Navy (RKKF) in 1925, MUKLEVIČ energetically assembled anti-Soviet personnel to be utilized within POW.

MUKLEVIČ involved his Deputy, the Zinovievite P. I. KURKOV[109] (he was a member of an anti-Soviet organization within the Navy), in subversive work and used this group to the advantage of POW.

MUKLEVIČ’s subversive work in the Navy began with the slowdown of construction of a torpedo boat, a patrol ship, and the first series of submarines. The design of these vessels was entrusted to IGNATIEV,[110] who headed a group of subversives within the Committee of Science and Technology. The deadlines for the design and construction of these vessels, which had been approved by the Revolutionary Military Council (RevVoienSovet), were arbitrarily violated and changed. Vessels that had been laid down on slipways were dismantled and re-laid multiple times. Orders for equipment were untimely and incomplete.

Upon assuming the position of the Head of the Main Directorate of GlavMorProm in 1934, MUKLEVIČ formed a subversive and diversionary organization there while maintaining contact with the anti-Soviet organization within RKKF.

MUKLEVIČ involved more than twenty leading specialists from among the Trotskyists, Zinovievites, and anti-Soviet-minded specialists in the subversive organization within the shipbuilding industry. With their assistance, MUKLEVIČ launched extensive subversive and diversionary activities in GlavMorProm and at shipbuilding plants.

As a result of this activity, the construction and delivery of a number of ships and submarines to VoienVed were delayed. For example, by delaying the production of diesel engines, the delivery of submarines to the Far East in the current year was disrupted. In the case of the Maliutka submarine, its dimensions were maliciously increased, making it impossible to transport by railway. The construction of serial destroyers was disrupted. On the flagman-destroyers, the hull of the ships were made too light, hindering the use of aft artillery. On cruisers, different parts of anti-aircraft artillery were placed in such a way that they could not be used simultaneously. The preparation of slipways for the laying of battleships at the Nikolaiev shipyards was disrupted as well.

In accordance with the agreement with the anti-Soviet organization within the RKKF, the testing of already completed ships was systematically delayed, and they were not put into service.

In addition to extensive subversive activities, MUKLEVIČ also prepared acts of sabotage.

For example, as directed by MUKLEVIČ, two members of POW within the shipbuilding industry, STRELTSOV[111] and BRODSKIJ, were to disable the large slipways at the Baltic shipyard. The plan was to carry out this act of sabotage either by closing electrical circuits, which were abundant in the surrounding scaffolding, or by organizing an explosion. However, MUKLEVIČ was unable to proceed with this plan.

Preparations were also made to disable a number of major defense plants in Leningrad, including certain units of the Kirov Plant. The Plant’s Assistant Director, Leon MARKOVSKIJ,[112] was also a member of POW.

Sabotage groups were created at major aviation plants (Plant No. 22, Perm Aviation Plant, etc.) and artillery plants (Molotov Plant, Barrikady, Tula Plant, Kiev Arsenal). Within the chemical industry, individuals such as LOGANOVSKIJ, BUDNIAK,[113] ARTAMONOV,[114] and BARANSKIJ organized sabotage groups as well.

The largest base for the sabotage network within the industry was created by defectors and emigrants from Poland who had settled mainly in the Urals and Siberia. However, in recent years major defense enterprises have been purged of these elements. Therefore, in order to create a highly conspiratorial sabotage network, Polish intelligence and POW recruited various non-Polish elements who have been working in the defense industry but have not been exposed.

The diversionary activities of Polish intelligence were primarily focused on the railways of the Western theater of war and the Trans-Siberian Railway, especially its Ural section. The aim of these activities was to cut off the Far East from the central part of the Soviet Union. However, the work of exposing the Polish diversionary groups within the transportation sector still remains largely unfinished.

In some cases, to test the readiness of the diversionary network created for wartime, the organization carried out diversionary acts in several locations.

For example, under the directive of the Ukrainian POW center, ­WEICHT,[115] a member of POW in the Dnipropetrovsk oblast, carried out a diversionary act at the Kamʹianska power station, resulting in its complete destruction.

TERRORIST WORK OF POLISH INTELLIGENCE

Under directives from Warsaw, individuals like UNŠLICHT, PESTKOVSKIJ, MAKOVSKIJ, DOMBALʹ, WIŚLAK, and MATUSZEWSKI, along with the Trotskyists, were engaged in preparing the central terrorist acts.

For instance, MATUSZEWSKI established a POW group within the Moscow police apparatus and involved a considerable number of police personnel (including non-Poles) in it. Together with ŠIPROVSKIJ[116] (former Secretary of the Police Party Committee, or PartKom), he conducted subversive activities within various sections of the police service (external service, communications, metro security, and the Police Communist Educational Institution, or KomVUZ).

Following the directives, DOMBALʹ, MATUSZEWSKI, and ŠIPROVSKIJ prepared central terrorist acts, taking advantage of the fact that group members were in charge of securing facilities frequented by government officials.

Recruited by SOSNOVSKIJ in Saratov, the Polish agent KASPERSKIJ[117] (editor of the regional newspaper Kommunist) was part of the Trotskyist organization. He was linked with the Saratov regional Trotskyist center and, in addition to his involvement in its subversive and sabotage activities (at a plant for combine harvesters, a lead-acid battery plant, Plant 195, etc.), he also participated in preparing central terrorist acts.

SOSNOVSKIJ and PILAR, who took part in preparing terrorist acts, also had a business contact with the regional Trotskyist center in Saratov.

Through KASPERSKIJ, the Saratov POW group had connections with an anti-Soviet right-wing organization in Saratov.

The POW branch in Dnepropetrovsk oblast, which is currently being eliminated, was involved in preparing central terrorist acts in collaboration with the Trotskyist and left-wing esers organization in Dneprodzerzhynsk. POW was in contact with them throughout their subversive and damaging activities.

In addition to terrorist activities, Moscow POW center received a directive to prepare several combat groups for committing central terrorist acts at such time that military aggression occurred against the USSR.

The work of creating such groups was led by PESTKOVSKIJ, a member of the Moscow POW center.

 

SABOTAGE WITHIN THE SOVIET INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE WORK

After the end of the Soviet–Polish war, the main POW personnel returned to Moscow. Using UNŠLICHT’s positions of the Deputy Chairman of the VChK – OGPU and later Deputy Chairman of the RVS, they began work on gaining control over crucial areas of VChK – OGPU activities (PILAR was Head of the VChK Counterintelligence Department, or KRO; SOSNOVSKIJ and his group were members of KRO VChK; OLSKIJ was Head of the Belarusian GPU; IKHNOVSKIJ[118] was Head of the Economy Council, or EKU OGPU; MEDVEDʹ was chairman of the Moscow Extraordinary Commission, or MChK, later he replaced MESSING as the People’s Commissar of OGPU in Leningrad Military District, or LVO; LOGANOVSKIJ, BARANSKIJ, and others were within the system of the Foreign Department, or INO VChK– OGPU –NKVD; finally, in RazvedUpr RKKA, there were BORTNOVSKIJ and others).

In the last year, the organization’s work within the system of VChK – OGPU – NKVD and RazvedUpr RKKA was streamlined in the following directions:

Complete paralysis of our counterintelligence efforts against ­Poland; ensuring the successful and unhindered work of Polish intelligence in the USSR; facilitating the infiltration and legalization of Polish agents on Soviet territory and in various sectors of the country’s economic life.

PILAR, OLSKIJ, SOSNOVSKIJ, and others in Moscow and Belarus, as well as MESSING, MEDVEDʹ, JANIŠEVSKIJ,[119] SENDZIKOVSKIJ[120] and others in Leningrad systematically disrupted our agencies’ activities against Polish intelligence, safeguarded local POW organizations from destruction, warned POW groups and individual members about available materials and upcoming operations, preserved and destroyed information received from honest agents regarding POW activities, infiltrated the intelligence network with double agents who worked for the Poles, prevented arrests, and halted investigations.

Capture and paralysis of all the intelligence work of NKVD and RazvedUpr RKKA against Poland. This strategy involved extensive and systematic disinformation campaigns against us, as well as the utilization of our intelligence apparatus abroad to provide Polish intelligence with the necessary information about other countries and to engage in anti-Soviet activities on the international stage.

For instance, a member POW, STASZEWSKI, who was assigned by UNŠLICHT to work abroad, used his stay in Berlin in 1923 to support BRANDLER[121] in undermining and suppressing the proletarian uprising in Germany. He did so in accordance with directives from UNŠLICHT.

Another POW member, ŽBIKOVSKIJ, dispatched by BRONKOWSKI for overseas work within RazvedUpr RKKA, engaged in provocative activities to complicate relations between the USSR and England.

Following UNŠLICHT’s directives, members of the organization, LOGANOVSKIJ and BARANSKIJ, utilized their positions within Warsaw INO during the period of JÓZEF PIŁSUDSKI’s removal from power. Under the guise of being part of the OGPU’s diversionary organizations of PILSUDKI’s followers, who targeted the Narodowa Demokracja (endeks) government in Poland, they prepared a provocative assassination attempt on French Marshal FOCHE upon his visit to Poland. This was done to disrupt the establishment of normal diplomatic relations between France and the USSR.

Exploitation of the positions held by POW members within VChK – OGPU – NKVD for extensive anti-Soviet work and espionage recruitment.

JÓZEF PIŁSUDSKI’s emissary and resident of the Second Department of PGŠ, Ignacy SOSNOWSKI, utilized his position extensively within the agencies to establish contact with various predominantly nationalist anti-Soviet elements. He also led their subversive activities in the South Caucasus, Central Asia, and other regions.

However, perhaps the greatest harm was caused by the theory and practice of passivity in counterintelligence work that was persistently and systematically executed by the Polish spies who had infiltrated VChK – OGPU – NKVD. By seizing key positions within our counterintelligence apparatus, Polish spies reduced its entire scope of work to narrow defensive measures within our territory. They prevented our counterintelligence agents from penetrating foreign intelligence centers and engaging in proactive counterintelligence actions.

By disrupting and preventing the primary method of counterintelligence work, which involves transferring our struggle against foreign intelligence to their own territory, Polish spies within our ranks achieved a situation where Soviet counterintelligence, originally entrusted by the proletarian state with the task of combating foreign intelligence and their activities as a whole, was transformed into a powerless apparatus that chased after individual petty spies for a number of years.

In cases where attempts at counterintelligence operations beyond our borders were made, they were either used by Polish intelligence to infiltrate their major agents into the USSR (the case of SAVINKOV[122]), or to establish contact with the anti-Soviet elements and generate their activities (the case of MOSKVIČ-BOYAROV, Prof. ISYČENKO,[123] etc.).

PROVOCATIVE ACTIVITIES BY POLISH INTELLIGENCE WITHIN THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF POLAND

The infiltration of a large Polish intelligence network into the Communist Party of Poland, the Polish section of the IKKI, and the apparatus of ComIntern was predetermined by the fact that when the Communist Party of Poland was formed at the end of 1918, a number of prominent members of the Polish Socialist Party (PPS-Left, or Lewica) and the Polish Social Democratic Party automatically joined the leadership of the Communist Party.

Regardless, the leadership of POW systematically introduced its agents into the ranks of the Communist Party through various provocative activities. Concurrently, the leadership recruited new agents from among the nationalist-leaning intelligentsia who had joined the communist movement. These agents were promoted within the party’s higher echelon with the aim of undermining the Communist Party and being used to POW’s benefit. POW also extensively utilized political emigration and exchanges of political prisoners to mass-infiltrate their agents into the USSR.

An example of one of the largest political provocations by the Piłsudski regime was the creation of the so-called PPS-Opozycja[124] in 1919. The leadership of this opposition, headed by ŻARSKI, LANDE-WITKOWSKI,[125] and Witold SZTURM-de-SZTREM,[126] consisted of prominent provocateurs known as peoviaks.[127] Initially, their task was to prevent revolutionary elements from leaving the PPS and joining the Communist Party. However, as they were unable to control the working masses who had separated from the PPS in 1920, this “Opposition” merged with them and joined the Communist Party of Poland, seizing several key leadership positions within the party.

Another major act of extensive political provocation carried out within the Communist Party of Poland (KPP) by the Piłsudski supporters who had infiltrated its leadership was the use of the KPP’s influence among the masses during PIŁSUDSKI’s May Coup of 1926. These provocateurs put forward and implemented a policy of supporting the Piłsudski Coup through the KPP.

Anticipating that some POW members (WARSKI,[128] KOSTRZEWA,[129] KRAJEWSKI,[130] and LANDE-WITKOWSKI) who had infiltrated the leadership of the KPP and directly worked on using the KPP to assist the Piłsudski Coup would be compromised and removed from the leadership, POW had another group of POW members on standby, led by LEŠINSKIJ. This group, externally detached from supporting the 1926 Coup, was intended to take control of the KPP leadership after the failure of WARSKI’s group.

After the May Coup, in order to divert the working masses from opposing the establishment of Piłsudski’s new fascist regime and to weaken and disintegrate the KPP from within, POW developed and executed a plan for extensive factional strife between LEŠINSKIJ’s group (known as the “minority” within the KPP) and WARSKI-KOSTRZEVA’s group (known as the “majority”). Both groups managed to involve their party masses in factional struggles and paralyzed the party’s work for a long time.

As a result, the leadership of the party was seized by the POW group led by LEŠINSKIJ, who was a member of the Moscow POW center. He focused on undermining the party even further and continued hindering the revolutionary movement in Poland.

In recent years, all the efforts of the Warsaw and Moscow centers of POW in terms of their work within the KPP have been directed towards undermining the unity of the popular front in Poland and, primarily, towards preparing to use the KPP for anti-Soviet actions during Poland’s military aggression against the USSR.

To this end, special work was carried out by UNŠLICHT and LEŠINSKIJ to use party channels for the Polish intelligence service’s communication during the war. In addition, a plan for a series of political provocations (presenting ultimatums to ComIntern and the VKP(b) on behalf of the KPP regarding the “integrity of Polish independence”, issuing anti-Soviet appeals to the Polish working class, causing a split within the party, etc.) was developed.

Starting from 1920, and especially after the May Coup, POW began using the channels of the Communist Party and the Polish section of ComIntern, which had been infiltrated by prominent members of POW, such as SOCHATSKI-BRATKOWSKI,[131] LEŠINSKIJ, PRÓCHNIAK,[132] ­BERTYNSKIJ,[133] BRONKOWSKI. They used these channels for systematic and extensive transfer of diversionary and espionage agents of various standing to the USSR as political emigrants and political prisoners. For instance, Polish spies like PILAR, BUDZINSKI, NAUISKAYTIS,[134] VYSOCKIJ, ­DOMBALʹ, and BELEWSKI[135] were sent to the USSR under the guise of being political prisoners, while individuals like WISLAK, Henryk LAUER[136] (who headed the metallurgy sector of GosPlan), ZDZIARSKI,[137] GENRIKHOWSKIJ,[138] BŽOZOVSKIJ, and many hundreds of others were sent as political emigrants. These agents infiltrated various sectors of the Soviet state apparatus, industry, transportation, and agriculture.

It wasn’t just the KPP that was used as cover for spies and saboteurs: Polish intelligence agents were also sent to the USSR under the guise of belonging to the Communist parties of Western Belarus, Western Ukraine, and other revolutionary organizations that Polish intelligence actively infiltrated for provocative purposes.

For example, the so-called “Belarusian Hramada”, a mass peasant organization in Western Belarus, was actively used by Polish intelligence and the fascist organization of Belarusian nationalists in Wilno to crush the peasant movement in Western Belarus and transfer its agents to the USSR.

Similarly, the mass organization known as the “independent peasant party” (nezaležna partija chlopska)[139] in proper Poland was created by a major provocateur, an officer of the Second Department of the PGŠ, WOJEWÓDZKI,[140] specifically to intercept the revolutionary movement among Polish peasants. It was also used to transfer agents to the USSR under the guise of “peasant” activists escaping police persecution.

All the materials of the investigation in this case overwhelmingly and undeniably prove that the vast majority of the so-called “political emigrants” from Poland were either members of POW (originating from the proper Poland, including Polish Jews), agents of the Second Department of the PGŠ, or agents of political police (Poles, Ukrainians, Belarusians, etc.).

 

ANTI-SOVIET ACTIVITY OF POLISH INTELLIGENCE IN BELARUS AND OTHER REGIONS OF THE USSR

In Belarus, POW was led by members of the Moscow center, like BENEK, as well as members of the Minsk center, such as VONSOVSKIJ, KLYS.[141] Under the guidance of PILAR, SOSNOVSKIJ, HELTMAN, and DOMBALʹ, POW established organic connections with the Belarus nationalist-fascists organization, the Trotskyist underground, and right-wing anti-Soviet organizations. This resulted in a unified anti-Soviet conspiracy in Belarus, led by CHERVIAKOV,[142] GOLODED,[143] and BENEK.

The unified underground carried out extensive subversive and destructive activities in Belarus, which were linked to the military plans of the Polish-German general staff.

The subversive work of the unified underground affected all sectors of the Belarusian economy, including transportation, planning, the fuel and energy sector, construction of new enterprises, all branches of light manufacturing, agriculture, and the construction of state farms.

Over the past few years, the unified underground, through the artificial spread of infectious diseases (such as meningitis, anemia, and plague), conducted significant work in the extermination of swine and horse populations in Belarus. In just 1936 alone, over 30,000 horses were exterminated in BSSR.

During its preparations for the seizure of the BSSR by the Poles, the unified underground initiated and attempted to carry out a destructive project of draining the Polesie marshes, which served as a natural obstacle to offensive actions by the Polish army. Concurrently, DOMBALʹ, who was developing projects like the Great Dnieper with destructive intentions, planned for the excavation of a deep-water canal in Belarus. This canal was meant to provide access for Polish military vessels to Soviet territory.

Simultaneously with subversive work in the BSSR’s agriculture, the unified underground actively prepared insurgent cadres and armed anti-Soviet uprisings. It also extensively used various methods to artificially incite dissatisfaction with the Soviet authorities among the population. These methods included deliberate “excesses” during various economic campaigns in rural areas, as well as over-taxation, illegal mass confiscations for tax evasion, and so on).

While maintaining direct connections with Poland through various channels, including the Moscow POW center, the Polish Consulate in Minsk, the Wilno center of Belarusian nationalist-fascists, and the Twelfth[144] Department of the PGŠ were directly involved in espionage activities. They had several contacts within units of the Belarusian Military District and were in touch with the military-fascist group led by the traitor TUKHACHEVSKIJ through one of this group’s members, UBOREVIČ.[145]

Under the direct instruction of ZINOVIEV,[146] a Trotskyist named HESSEN[147] established a terrorist group from the participants of the unified underground. This group was working on an assassination attempt against comrade VOROŠILOV[148] during his stay in Minsk in the autumn of 1936.

The NKVD of the BSSR eliminated the leadership of the anti-Soviet underground movement in Belarus based on minimal data obtained during an initial investigation in Moscow, as well as through repeated interrogation of the previously arrested Belarusian nationalist-fascists. This demonstrated NKVD’s skillful operational use of limited initial information to crush the organizing forces of the enemy.

The work to eliminate POW in the Far East, Siberia, the Sverdlovsk and Chelyabinsk regions, as well as in Ukraine, has been unsatisfactory so far. Despite having exceptional opportunities in 1933–1935 to expose the underground activities of POW (including the arrests of SKARBEK’s, STASIAK’s[149] and KONIECKIJ’s[150] groups),[151] the apparatus of the NKVD in Ukraine did not initiate investigations to the extent necessary for the complete exposure of POW activities in Ukraine. This situation was exploited by SOSNOVSKIJ, a spy who had been working at the Special Department of Central Intelligence, to localize the overall failure.

While distributing collections of the interrogation protocols of individuals like UNŠLICHT and others who were arrested, I SUGGEST that all Heads of the Operational Departments within GUGB and leading personnel of the Third Departments familiarize themselves with this letter.

Plenipotentiaries: PEOPLE’S COMMISAR OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE USSR, PEOPLE’S COMMISAR FOR STATE SECURITY (N. YEZHOV).[152]

ACKNOWLEDGED: OPERATIONAL SECRETARY OF GUGB NKVD of the USSR, brigade commander [signature] (ULMER).[153]

 

Zakrytoe pisʹmo o fašistsko-povstančeskoj, špionskoj, diversionnoj, poraženčeskoj i terrorističeskoj dejatelʹnosti polʹskoj razvedki v SSSR, 11 August 1937, Central Archive of Federal Security Service of Russian Federation (TsA FSB RF): f. 3, op. 4, d. 14, ll. 43–85.

Originally published in: Jurij Šapoval, Volodymyr Prystajko, and Vadym Zolotarʹov, ČK–HPU–NKVD v Ukrajini: Osoby, fakty, dokumenty (Kyjiv: Abrys, 1997), pp. 350–377.

 

 

[1]        POW, Polska Organizacja Wojskowa (Polish Military Organization): a secret military organization founded in 1914 by Józef Piłsudski to fight against enemies of Poland. It did not exist in the independent Polish Republic.

[2]        Józef Klemens Piłsudski (1867–1935): Polish military commander and statesman, the first head of state of the restored Polish state (1918–1922) and commander-in-chief of the Polish army during the Polish-Soviet war in 1920. In 1926, he organized a coup d’etat and established a personal dictatorship in Poland.

[3]        Juzef Unšlicht (1879–1937): Soviet politician of Polish origin; member of the All-Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks; VKP[b]), member of the Revolutionary Military Council (RVS) of the Sixteenth Army and the Western Front. In 1919–1920, served as a member of the Revolutionary Committee of Poland, and later as the Secretary of the Union Council of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee (TsIK) of the USSR. He was arrested in 1937 and executed in 1938.

[4]        Romualʹd Muklevič (1890–1938): Soviet politician of Polish origin; member of the VKP(b), served as Deputy People’s Commissar of the People’s Commissariat of Defense Industry (NKOP) of the USSR. He was arrested in 1937 and executed in 1938.

[5]        Jan Olskij, aka Kulikovskij (1898–1937): Soviet politician of Polish origin; member of the VKP(b). In 1927–1930, he served as the Head of the Counter-Intelligence Division of the Joint State Political Directorate (KRO OGPU) of the USSR; in 1930–1931, he served as the Head of the OGPU Special Office. He was arrested and executed in 1937.

[6]        GlavRazvedUpr RKKA: a foreign military intelligence agency of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, formed in 1918 as the Registration Agency, since 1942 known as GRU RKKA.

[7]        This group within the All-Russian Communist Party of the Bolsheviks (VKP[b]) consisted of followers of Nikolaj Bucharin, Alexej Rykov, and Michail Tomskij. Instead of advocating for the elimination of capitalist elements in both urban and rural areas, they supported their free development.

[8]        Trotskyism: a Marxist political ideology developed by Russian revolutionary Leon Trotsky (1879–1940) and other members of the Left Opposition in the Soviet State. In early Soviet propaganda, it was used as an average image of the enemy, sometimes in conjunction with the image of a fascist and a western spy.

[9]        Michail Tuchačevskij (1893–1937): Russian military commander; member of the VKP(b). He joined the Red Army in 1918 and served as Commander of the Western Front in 1920 during the Polish-Soviet war; later served as the First Deputy of the People’s Commissar of the People’s Commissariat of Defense (NKO), the Commander of the troops of the Volga Military District, and held the rank of Marshal of the Soviet Union. He was arrested and executed in 1937.

[10]     Stanislav Messing (1890–1937): Soviet politician; member of the VKP(b); twice Deputy Chairman of the OGPU of the USSR; in 1929–1931, he was Head of the Foreign Department (INO) of the OGPU; later served as the Chairman of the Presidium of the All-Union Chamber of Commerce of the USSR. He was arrested and executed in 1937.

[11]     Romuald, aka Roman Pilar von Pilchau (1894–1937): Soviet intelligence officer of German origin; member of the VKP(b), served as the Head of the Directorate of the People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs (UNKVD) for Saratov region. He was arrested and executed in 1937.

[12]     Filipp Medvedʹ (1899–1937): Soviet politician of Belarusian origin; member of the VKP(b). He was Head of the UNKVD for Leningrad oblast. He was arrested in 1935 and sentenced by VKVS to 3 years of labor camps but was released early in the same year. Medvedʹ was appointed Head of the Kulunskii Intelligence District of the North-Eastern Corrective Labor Camp (ITL) of the NKVD. He was arrested again, sentenced and executed in 1937.

[13]     Ignacij Sosnovskij (1897–1937): Soviet secret services officer of Polish origin; member of the VKP(b). In 1919–1920, he served as First Deputy Head of the UNKVD for the Saratov region and Commissioner of State Security of the third rank. He was arrested in 1936 and executed in 1937.

[14]     Jurij Makovskij (1889–1937): Soviet secret services officer of Polish origin; member of the VKP(b). He worked for the Foreign Department (INO) of the OGPU; later, he was Head of the UNKVD for Omsk oblast. He was arrested in 1935 and executed in 1937.

[15]     Mečislav Loganovskij (1895–1938): participant of the October Revolution, commander of the light artillery division of the 1st Polish Red Army, diplomat of the USSR. He was arrested 1937 and executed in 1938.

[16]     Kazimir Baranskij (1894–1937): Soviet politician of Polish origin; member of the VKP(b). He worked at the Foreign Department of the Main Directorate of State Security (INO GUGB) of the USSR; in 1936, he became the Head of the Sixth Division of the Transport Department of the GUGB NKVD. He was arrested and executed in 1937.

[17]     The name of the First World War established in Soviet historiography and propaganda.

[18]     This refers to the period prior to the first partition of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1772 between Russia, Austria and Prussia.

[19]     Endek: a member of the National Democracy movement (Narodowa Demokracja), a Polish right-wing political movement with nationalistic ideology and one of the main political forces in interwar Poland.

[20]     Aleksander Prystor (1847–1941): Polish politician, he was one of the founders of the Combat Organization of the Polish Socialist Party (1905). Prystor served as the Prime Minister of Poland from 1931 to 1933, and the Marshal of the Polish Senate from 1935 to 1938. He was arrested by the NKVD in Kaunas in 1940 and transported to Moscow, where he died in prison in 1941.

[21]     Kazimierz Pużak (1883–1950): Polish politician, one of the leaders of the Polish Socialist Party (PPS). He was arrested in Lodz on 3 April 1911, and sentenced by the Warsaw court to 8 years’ hard labor. He served his sentence in prisons in Warsaw and St. Petersburg, and from 1915 in the Shlisselburg fortress. He was released in February 1917. Pużak was State Secretary of the Postal and Telegraph Ministry of Poland in 1918 and General Secretary of the Central Executive Committee of the PPS in 1931–1939. Arrested in November 1947. Sentenced to 10 years in prison. Died in Rawicz prison on 30 April 1950.

[22]     The spelling is as it appears in the document. Correct name: Tadeusz Ludwik Hołówko (1889–1931), Polish politician, publicist. In the years 1921–1925, he was a member of the central authorities of the PPS; in 1921–1925, a member of the Supreme Council of the PPS; in 1924–1925, a member of the Central Executive Committee. In the years 1927–1930, Head of the Eastern Department in the Political Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 1930, he was elected as a member of the Sejm of the third term.

[23]     Henryk Jan Józewski (1892–1981): Polish politician, close collaborator of Józef Piłsudski, advocate of the Polish-Ukrainian alliance. He served as voivode of Volhynia in 1928–29 and 1930–1938.

[24]     Ignacy Hugo Stanisław Matuszewski (1891–1946): Polish politician and diplomat in 1920 during the Polish-Soviet war, he was a Head of Polish intelligence.

[25]     Revolutionary Military Council, RVS: the designation of the headquarters and the first military and order organs created by the Bolshevik party after the overthrow of the Provisional Government in Russia during the October Revolution.

[26]     The spelling is as it appears in the document. Correct name is Julian Leščinskij, aka Lenskij (1899–1937); Polish: Julian Leszczyński. Polish and Soviet politician; member of the VKP(b). General Secretary of the Communist Party of Poland; member of the Presidium of the ComIntern Executive Committee (IKKI). He was arrested and executed in 1937.

[27]     Jakov Doleckij, aka Fenigštejn (1888–1937): Soviet politician of Jewish origin. In 1925–1937, Head of the USSR Telegraph Agency (TASS). He committed suicide in 1937.

[28]     Bronisław Bortnowski, aka Bronkowski (1898–1937): Polish politician; member of the Communist Party of Poland. In 1924, he started serving as a Deputy Head of RU RKKA and Head of the Intelligence Department; joined ComIntern in 1929. In 1934, he became the President of the Executive Committee of the Polish-Baltic Regional Secretariat of ComIntern. He was arrested and executed in 1937.

[29]     Roman Longva (1891–1938): Soviet military of Polish origin; member of the VKP(b). Head of the Communications Directorate of the Red Army (RKKA). He was arrested in 1937 and executed in 1938.

[30]     Jan Vojtyga (1894–1937): Soviet politician of Polish origin; member of the VKP(b). Head of the Department of the Main Directorate for Motorways (GUSHOSDOR) of NKVD. He was arrested and executed in 1937.

[31]     Viktor Vitkowskij, aka Marčevskij (1895–1937): Soviet politician of Polish origin. He worked as a planner-economist at the Transportation Department of the People’s Commissariat of Heavy Industry of the USSR. He was arrested and executed in 1937.

[32]     Wiktor Kijakowski, aka Kijakowski-Steckiewicz (1889–1932): Polish military. He was a personnel officer of the Second Department of the PGSh; served as a resident agent of the Polish military intelligence services in Petrograd. Later, he served as the Head of the Fourth Department of Counter-Intelligence at OGPU and as the chief representative of OGPU in Mongolia. He died during the suppression of the uprising in the Mongolian People’s Republic in 1932.

[33]     Karl Roller (1896–1937): Soviet military of Polish origin; member of the VKP(b). He served as Head of the Detention Facilities Department of the OGPU for the Kursk region and held the rank of Captain in the State Security (GB). He was arrested and executed in 1937.

[34]     Julian Bžozovskij (1898–1937): Soviet politician of Polish origin; member of the VKP(b); served as the Deputy Head of the Fifth Department of the Main Directorate of State Security (UGB) of the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR. He was arrested and executed in 1937.

[35]     Stanislav Budkievič (1887–1937): Soviet official of Polish origin; member of the VKP(b). He served as the Head of the Fourth Department of the Fourth Directorate of the Red Army Staff, and the Academic Secretary of the Soviet Military Encyclopedia Editorial Board; held the rank of Brigade Commissar. He was arrested and executed in 1937.

[36]     Stefan Žbikovskij (1891–1937): Soviet official of Polish origin; member of the VKP(b). In 1934–1936, he was a resident agent of the Red Army’s Intelligence Service (RU RKKA) in China. He was arrested and executed in 1937.

[37]     Zdislav Širinskij, aka Šerinskij (1888–1938): Soviet official of Polish origin; member of the VKP(b). In 1925, he was recruited by the Chief Directorate of the Red Army Staff and subsequently served as a resident agent in Paris; retired in1935. He was arrested in 1936 and sentenced to five years of labor camps (ITL); later sentenced to execution in 1938 and executed the same year.

[38]     Semen Firin, aka Pupko (1898–1937): Soviet official of Jewish origin; member of the VKP(b). He served as the Head of the White Sea-Baltic Canal labor camp; Head of DmitLag forced labor camp of the NKVD, and Deputy Head of the Chief Administration of Corrective Labor Camps (GULAG) of the NKVD; held the rank of Senior Major in the State Security (GB). He was arrested and executed in 1937.

[39]     Aleksandr Jodlovskij (1900–1937): Soviet official of Polish origin; member of the VKP(b). He was a staff member of the Red Army’s Intelligence Services (RU RKKA); held the rank of Colonel. He was arrested and executed in 1937.

[40]     Stefan Uzdanskij (1898–1937): Soviet military of Jewish origin; member of the VKP(b). He served as the Deputy Head of the Department in the Red Army’s Intelligence Services (RU RKKA); held the rank of Colonel. He was arrested and executed in 1937.

[41]     Maks Maksimov (1894–1937): Soviet military of Jewish origin; member of the VKP(b). He worked as an employee of the Intelligence Department of the Red Army (RU RKKA) and held the position of Regiment Commissar. He was arrested and executed in 1937.

[42]     Vladislav Kochanskij (1897–1938): Soviet official of Polish origin. Member of the VKP(b), Head of the Motorized Armored Forces of the Leningrad Military District (LVO), Commander of the Fifth Heavy Bomber Aviation Corps of the Trans-Baikal Military District. Corps Commander. He was arrested in 1937 and executed in 1938.

[43]     Juzef Kozlovskij (1895–1937): Soviet official of Polish origin. Member of the VKP(b), Head of the Political Department of the Fifth Aviation Brigade, and Head of the Political Directorate of the Belarussian Military District. He was arrested and executed in 1937.

[44]     Ieronim Morštyn (1901–1937): Soviet official of Jewish origin. Member of the VKP(b), he was Deputy Head of the Economy Department of the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. He was arrested and executed in 1937.

[45]     Evgenij Konic-Gorfinkel (1897–1937): Polish official; member of the Communist Party of Poland. Administrative Secretary for the Baltic States and Poland in the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. He was arrested and executed in 1937.

[46]     The spelling is as it appears in the document. Correct name: Stefan Bratman-Brodovskij (1880–1937). Soviet functionary of Polish origin; member of the VKP(b). Plenipotentiary of the USSR in Latvia. He was arrested on 2 July 1937; sentenced and executed on 27 October 1937. Bratman-Brodowski was rehabilitated on May 30, 1956.

[47]     Leon Gaikis (1898–937): Soviet diplomat of Jewish origin; member of the VKP(b). Plenipotentiary of the USSR in Spain. He was arrested and executed in 1937.

[48]     Mieczysław Krakowski, aka Mikhail Karskij (1900–1937): Soviet diplomat of Jewish origin; member of the VKP(b) and plenipotentiary of the USSR in Turkey. He was arrested and executed in 1937.

[49]     Polish name of the city; now has its Lithuanian name: Vilnius.

[50]     Polish name of the city; now has its Ukrainian name: Lviv.

[51]     Ekspozytura: here the name of the field structure of the Second Department of the General Staff of the Polish Army, i.e., Branch No. 1 of the Second General Staff of the Polish Army in Vilnius, etc.

[52]     Samuil Lazovert (1885–1937): Soviet lawyer of Jewish origin. Member of the Communist Party of Bolsheviks of Ukraine, State Arbitrator at the Council of People’s Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR. He was arrested and executed in 1937.

[53]     Bolesław Skarbek-Szacki (1888–1934): Polish communist; editor of the newspapers Komunista Polski, Głos Komunisty, Sierp, and Trybuna Radziecka.

[54]     Henryk Politur-Radziejowski (1899–1937): Ukrainian scholar of Polish origin; Deputy Editor of the Kyiv newspaper Sierp in 1927–1929. In 1931, he became a Researcher at the Institute of Polish Culture and the Head of the Department at the Polish Pedagogical Institute. He was arrested in 1933 and sentenced to ten years of imprisonment. In 1937, he was sentenced again and executed.

[55]     Konstanty Teofil Wiszniewski, aka Wiśniewski (1893–1937): Polish communist; editor of the newspapers Sztandar komunizmu and Sierp. In 1923, he became the Deputy Secretary of the Polish Bureau of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) Ukraine (KPbU). Wiszniewski was sentenced and executed in 1937.

[56]     Kazimir Benek (1895–1938): Soviet official of Belarusian origin; member of the CK VKP (b) of Belarus. He was also a member of the Central Executive Committee of the Belarusian SSR and People’s Commissar of Agriculture of the BSSR. He was arrested in 1937 and executed in 1938.

[57]     Party of Socialists-Revolutionaries, Esers, a left-wing political party founded in 1901 by revolutionaries originating from the so-called Narodniks. It was illegal until the February Revolution; after the October Revolution, it was banned again by the Bolsheviks. In 1922, SR leaders were arrested and sentenced to death or long prison terms. Due to the protests of socialist activists of the Second International, the death sentences were not carried out, but none of those tried ever left Soviet prisons.

[58]     Nikolaj Bucharin (1888–1938): Russian revolutionary and Soviet politician; member of the VKP(b). Candidate for membership in the Central Committee of the VKP(b) (1934–1937). Chief editor of the newspaper Izvestija. Leader of the so-called right-wing opposition within the VKP(b). He was arrested and executed in 1938.

[59]     Stanislav Pestkovskij (1882–1937): Soviet political activist of Polish origin; member of the VKP(b). Political assistant in the secretariat of Dmitrii Manuilskij at ComIntern. He was arrested and executed in 1937.

[60]     Jean Guillaume Lavergne: Head of the French military mission in Russia during the Civil War.

[61]     Stanislav Bobinskij (1882–1937): Soviet revolutionary of Polish origin; member of the VKP(b). Secretary of the Polish Bureau of the CK of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and member of the Executive Committee of ComIntern. He was arrested and executed in 1937.

[62]     Bolesław Wieniawa-Długoszowski (1881–1942): Polish general and diplomat; a trusted man of Józef Piłsudski. In 1937, he was the commander of the Cavalry Division in Warsaw. In 1938–1940, he served as Polish ambassador to Italy.

[63]     Jerzy, aka Yurii Makovskij (1889–1937): Soviet official of Polish origin; member of the VKP(b). He was an employee of the Foreign Department of the OGPU, and Head of the Special Department of the Main Directorate of the NKVD for the Omsk region. He was arrested in 1935 and executed in 1937.

[64]     Adam Slavinskij, aka Kočarovskij (1885–1937): Soviet official of Polish origin; member of the VKP(b). In 1934–1937, he was Head of the inspection group at the Central Directorate of Roads of the People’s Commissariat for Communications. He was arrested and executed in 1937.

[65]     Stanisław Majewski: in 1918, he was a soldier in the Warsaw Revolutionary Red Regiment. In 1919, he served at the School of Instructors of the Western Rifle Division.

[66]     The spelling is as it appears in the document. The correct spelling is Stanislav Dluskij, aka Stanislav Štylʹ-Flatau (1906–1936?): Soviet communist activist of Polish origin; Head of the party school in Kyiv. Head of the Foreign Aid Bureau of the Communist Party of Western Ukraine (KPZU). He was arrested in 1935 and held in custody by the Special Corps of the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR.

[67]     Władysław Ścibor (1891–1938): Polish communist activist. In 1918, he started serving at the Warsaw Revolutionary Red Regiment as a political Commissar.

[68]     Vaclav Gruzel (1884–1937): Polish military and Soviet official; member of the VKP(b). Military commissar of the 52nd Rifle Division, Western and Southern fronts (1918–1921); senior secretary of the Collegiate of the Caucasus Communist Party under the Central Committee of the VKP(b) for the Yaroslavl region. He was arrested and executed in 1937.

[69]     Stepan Černickij (1884–1934): Soviet military; member of the VKP(b). In 1920, he became the Сommissar of the Fifty-Third Border Division; later, Deputy Head of the Special Inspection of the Main Directorate of the Workers and Peasants’ Militia (RKM) attached to the Council of People’s Commissars (SNK) of RSFSR. He died in 1934.

[70]     Artur Staševskij, aka Giršfelʹd (1890–1937): Soviet military of Jewish origin; member of the VKP(b). In 1924–1925, he was the leader of the united residency (Foreign Intelligence of the VChK – OGPU and Intelligence Directorate of the RKKA) in Berlin. From 1925 to 1936, he held various positions in the People’s Commissariat for External Trade and served as Soviet trade representative in Spain. He was arrested and executed in 1937.

[71]     Adam Budkevič (1912–1937): Soviet official of Polish origin. He was involved in alcohol production at the Pokryshev distillery. He was arrested and executed in 1937.

[72]     Vaclav Poličkevič (1890–1937): Soviet military of Polish origin; member of the VKP (b). He held the rank of senior lieutenant of the State Security. He was arrested and executed in 1937.

[73]     Stanislav Čackij (1899–1937): Soviet official; senior lieutenant of the State Security; member of the VKP(b). In 1920, he joined the Special Department of the VChK. He worked for the NKVD Foreign Department. He was arrested and executed in 1937.

[74]     Kazimir Cichovskij, aka Vysockij (1887–1937): Soviet political activist of Polish origin; member of the Polish Communist Party. He worked for the Personnel Department of the ComIntern Executive Committee (IKKI). During the Spanish Civil War, he was in the International Brigades. He was arrested and executed in 1937.

[75]     Lithuanian-Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic: puppet state established in 1919 on the territories occupied by the Red Army in what are now modern Belarus and Lithuania.

[76]     Stefan Heltman (1886–1937): political activist of Polish origin; member of the VKP(b). In 1924–1925, he served as the Secretary of the Politburo of CK VKP(b). Later, he was the Deputy Chairman of the Scientific and Technical Council of the People’s Commissariat for Grain and Animal Husbandry of the USSR. He was arrested and executed in 1937.

[77]     Jan Nejman (1894–1937): communist activist of Polish origin. In 1927–1930, he served as the Secretary of the Central Polish Bureau (TsPB) of the CK VKP(b). In 1930–1933, he was the Chief Editor of Trybuna Radziecka. He was arrested on 26 January 1937; sentenced and executed on 21 August 1937. Nejman was rehabilitated on 15 September 1956.

[78]     Vladislav Vnorovskij (1897–1937?): political activist of Polish origin. In 1921–1923, he served as the Chairman and Secretary of the Russian–Ukrainian delegation in Poland. He was also the Secretary of the Polish Bureau of CK VKP(b) of Belarus. Vnorovskij was arrested in 1937 and executed.

[79]     Bronislav Vonsovskij (1898–1938): Soviet political activist of Polish origin; member of the VKP(b). In 1925, he became the member of the Polish Bureau of the CK VKP(b) of Belarus. He was arrested and executed in 1937.

[80]     Mečislav Mazepus (1893–1937): Soviet military of Polish origin; member of the Communist Party of Poland and VKP(b). He served in the Main Directorate of State Security (GUGB NKVD). He held the rank of Senior Lieutenant in the State Security agencies. He was arrested in 1936 and executed in 1937.

[81]     Tomaš Dombalʹ (1890–1937): political activist of Polish origin. Doctor of Economic Sciences, academician, and member of the VKP(b). He worked as the Head of the Department at the Moscow Institute of Mechanization and Electrification of Socialist Agriculture. He was arrested in 1936 and executed in 1937.

[82]     Evgenij Prinz (?–1937): Chief editor of the Polish-language newspaper Orka, published in Belarus between 1926–1937. He was arrested and executed in 1937.

[83]     Genrich Žarskij (1902–1937): Soviet journalist of Jewish origin; member of the VKP(b). He served as an editor for the newspaper Orka in Minsk. He was arrested and executed in 1937.

[84]     Georgii, aka Yurii Piatakov (1890–1937): Soviet official; member of VKP(b). In 1931–1932, he served as the Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Board of the National Economy (VSNKh) of the USSR; in 1932–1934, he was Deputy People’s Commissar of Heavy Industry; in 1934–1936, 1st Deputy People’s Commissar of Heavy Industry. He was arrested in 1936 and executed in 1937.

[85]     Lev Kamenev, aka Rozenfeld (1883–1936): Soviet official of Jewish origin; member of the VKP(b) (repeatedly expelled and reinstated). He was the Director of the Maksim Gorkii Institute of World Literature of the USSR Academy of Sciences. He was sentenced to death and executed in 1936.

[86]     In December 1925, at the XIV Congress of the VKP(b), Grigorij Zinoviev, with the support of Lev Kamenev and the delegation from Leningrad, spoke out against the group led by Joseph Stalin, which included Vjačeslav Molotov, Alexej Rykov, Nikolaj Bucharin, and others.

[87]     The Second Department of the Polish General Staff, which was responsible for military intelligence and counterintelligence.

[88]     Nikolaj Efimov (1897–1937): Soviet military; member of the VKP(b). He served as Head of the Artillery Directorate of the RKKA. He was arrested and executed in1937.

[89]     Fedor Karin, aka Todres Krutianskij (1896–1937): Soviet military of Jewish origin; member of VKP(b). He served as Head of the Second Department of the Red Army’s Main Political Directorate (RU RKKA). He held the rank of Corps Commissar. He was arrested, sentenced and executed in 1937.

[90]     Lev Meier-Zakharov (1899–1937): Soviet military; member of the VKP(b). He served as the Deputy Head of the RU RKKA. He was arrested and executed in 1937.

[91]     Iosif Pruss (1891–1937): Soviet official of Polish origin; member of the VKP(b). He served as the Deputy Prosecutor of the USSR. He was arrested and executed in 1937.

[92]     Sergej PuziсCKij (1895–1937): Soviet military; member of the VKP(b). He served as the Deputy Head of the Dmitrovsk forced labor camp of the NKVD. He held the rank of the State Security Commissar of the third level. He was arrested and executed in 1937.

[93]     Text enclosed in curly braces {...} is text inserted between lines.

[94]     Tadeusz Kowalski (1896–?): Polish military, Lieutenant in the Polish Army, Assistant Military Attaché of Poland in Moscow. In 1924, he was recruited by the OGPU. In 1931, he started working at the Polish legation in Tallinn. In 1933, he served as the military attaché at the Polish consulate in Daugavpils.

[95]     Tadeusz Kobylański (1895–1967): Polish military and diplomat. In 1923, he started working at the Second Department of the Polish Ministry of Defense. In 1924, he became the Assistant Military Attaché of Poland in Moscow. In February 1929, he was transferred to the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 1935–1939, he served as the acting Vice Director of the Political and Economic Department of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and as the Head of the Eastern Division of the Ministry.

[96]     Jan Wiślak, aka Hempel (1877–1937): Polish communist. He worked at Trybuna Radziecka. He was arrested and executed in 1937.

[97]     Kazimir Nauiokaytis (1896–1938): Soviet official of Lithuanian origin; member of the VKP(b). He was the Head of the Regional Department of Counterintelligence of the NKVD in Saratov oblast. He was arrested and executed in 1937.

[98]     The spelling is as it appears in the document. The correct name is Genrich Bržozovskij (1899–1937): Soviet military of Polish origin; member of the VKP(b). He served as the Deputy Head of the Main Directorate of State Security (GUGB) of the NKVD. He was arrested in 1936 and executed in 1937.

[99]     Michał Sokolnicki (1880–1967): Polish politician and diplomat; member of the Polish Socialist Party (PPS). In 1931–1936, he served as Polish envoy in Denmark, then as the Polish envoy in Turkey in 1936–1945.

[100]   Stefan Botner (1890–1937): Soviet official of Polish origin; member of the VKP(b). He served as Head of the Defense Sector of GosPlan, as well as senior editor of the Voiennaia mysl magazine. He was arrested and executed in 1937.

[101]   Aleksandr Gorbatiuk (1891–1937): Soviet military; member of the VKP(b); served under the command of the Personnel Directorate of the RKKA. He was arrested and executed in 1937.

[102]   Vaclav Kolesinskij (1898–1937): Soviet functionary of Polish origin. He served as the Deputy Head of the Second Main Directorate of the People’s Commissariat of Defense Industry (NKOP). He was arrested, sentenced and executed in 1937.

[103]   Anna Muklevič (1900–1937): Soviet functionary; member of the VKP(b). She served as Head of the Department of Material Balances and Material Supply of GosPlan. She was arrested and executed in 1937.

[104]   Ivan Smilga (1892–1938): Soviet politician of Latvian origin. He was expelled from the VKP(b) in 1934 as a trotskyist. In 1924–1927, he was Director of the Moscow Institute of National Economy. He was arrested in 1928 and sentenced to four years of exile. He was released in 1929 and worked as the Deputy Chairman of GosPlan and a member of the Presidium of VSNKh. He was arrested again in 1935 and sentenced to five years of imprisonment. In 1938, he was executed.

[105]   Semen Erman (1900–1937): Soviet official of Jewish origin; member of the VKP(b). He served as the Deputy Head of the Main Military Mobilization Department in the People’s Commissariat of Heavy Industry (NarKomTiazhProm). He was arrested in 1936 and executed in 1937.

[106]   Markel Kroževskij (1898–1937): Soviet official of Jewish origin; member of the VKP(b). He served as the Deputy Head of the Main Military Mobilization Department of the NarKomTiazhProm. He was arrested in 1936 and was sentenced and executed in 1937.

[107]   Stanislav Ratajčak (1894–1937): Soviet functionary of German origin; member of the VKP(b). He served as the Head of the Main Department of Chemical Industry at NarKomTiazhProm. He was arrested in 1936 and executed in 1937.

[108]   Aleksandr Emšanov (1891–1937): Soviet functionary, manager of the Caucasian Railway (KVZHD). In 1926–1931, he served as the Chairman of the KVZHD Board. In 1931–1934, he headed the transportation sector of the State GosPlan. In 1934, he started working as the Head of the Moscow–Donbass Railway. He was arrested and executed in 1937.

[109]   Petr Kurkov (1889–1937): Soviet military; member of the VKP(b). He worked at the People’s Commissariat of Defense (NKO) in the personnel management department of the RKKA. He was arrested and executed in 1937.

[110]   Nikolaj Ignatiev (1880–1938): Soviet scientist, not party-affiliated. He was the Deputy Head of Department “A” at the Scientific Research Institute of Naval Shipbuilding. In 1931, he was sentenced to death with commutation to ten years of forced labor. He was released in 1934, arrested again in 1937, and executed in 1938.

[111]   Boris Strelcov-Zal (1886–1937): Soviet naval engineer of Jewish origin; member of the VKP(b). He worked as Chief Engineer of the Baltic shipyard, as well as the Head of the Second Main Directorate of the NKOP. He was arrested and executed in 1937.

[112]   Leon Markovskij (1895–1937): Soviet official of Jewish origin; member of the VKP(b). He was the Deputy Director in charge of administrative and economic affairs at the Kirov Plant. He was arrested and executed 1937.

[113]   Daniil Budniak (1886–?): Soviet functionary of Polish origin; member of the VKP(b). He was Director of the Barrikady factory in Stalingrad. He was arrested in 1937.

[114]   Konstantin Artamonov (1892–1937): Soviet functionary; member of the VKP(b). He was Deputy Head of the Third Main Directorate of the People’s Commissariat for Defense Industry of the USSR. He was arrested and executed in 1937.

[115]   Edward Weicht (1902–1937): Soviet electrician of Polish origin. He worked at the Dniprodzerzhynsk branch of the All-Union Electrical Association. He was arrested and executed in 1937.

[116]   Adam Šiprovskij (1893–1937): Soviet communist of Polish origin. He was Secretary of the Party Committee of the Main Directorate of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Militia (RKМ). He was arrested and executed in 1937.

[117]   Vladimir Kasperskij (1896–1938): Soviet writer and journalist; member of the VKP(b). He was a writer and senior editor of the newspaper Pravda Saratovskogo kraia; Chief Editor of the newspaper Kommunist. He was arrested in 1937 and executed in 1938.

[118]   Marian Ichnovskij (1886–1937): Soviet political activist of Polish origin, not party-affiliated. He was Head of the Department of the All-Union Trade Association with the Mongolia and Tuva Republics (SovMongTuvTorg). He was arrested and executed in 1937.

[119]   Dionis Janiševskij (1898–1938): Soviet official of Polish origin; member of the VKP(b). He was Deputy Head of the Special Department of the LVO. He was arrested in 1934 and sentenced to two years of labor camp. He served his sentence in the Kolyma region. He was released in 1936 and appointed manager of a gold mine operated by the Far North Construction Trust (DalStroi). He was arrested again in 1937, transferred to Leningrad and executed in 1938.

[120]   Ivan Sendzikovskij (1895–1937): Soviet official of Polish origin; member of the VKP(b). He worked for the Regional Department of the NKVD in Leningrad Oblast. He was arrested and executed in 1937.

[121]   Heinrich Brandler (1881–1967): German politician; one of the founders of the Communist Party of Germany (KPG). In 1921–1924, he served as Chairman of the KPG. He was expelled from the KPG in 1929.

[122]   Boris Savinkov (1879–1925): leader of the Combat Organization of the Socialist Revolutionary Party; Head of the anti-Soviet Union for the Defense of Homeland and Freedom. In 1920–1921, he resided in Warsaw. In August 1924, he arrived in the USSR illegally and was arrested in Minsk. He was sentenced to execution in 1924; the sentence was later changed to ten years of imprisonment. Savinkov ended his life by suicide in prison in 1925.

[123]   Petro Isyčenko (1882–1924): Ukrainian scholar, not party-affiliated. He was a Professor at the Moscow Cooperative Institute. He was arrested and executed in 1924.

[124]   Polish Socialist Party – Opposition (PPS-Opposition), a branch of the Polish Socialist Party operating in the period 1912–1914.

[125]   The spelling is as it appears in the document. Correct name: Adam Landy, aka Witkowski (1891–1937). Polish communist activist. He was a lecturer at the Higher School of Professional Advancement at the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions (VTsSPS). He was arrested and executed in 1937.

[126]   Witold Szturm de Sztrem (1888–1933): Polish political activist; member of the Communist Party of Poland, one of the leaders of the PPS-Left. In 1919, he joined the RKKA. He served as a member of the covert residency of the RU RKKA in Austria. In December 1933, he disappeared in the vicinity of Vienna (according to a different version, he was killed by agents of the OGPU due to the risk of defecting to the enemy).

[127]   In NKVD documents from the mid-1930s, the word peoviak (poviak, poeviak) referred to membership in the POW.

[128]   Adolf Warski, aka Adolf Jerzy Warszawski (1868–1937): Polish communist leader, one of the founders of the KPP. He was arrested and executed in 1937.

[129]   Wera Kostrzewa, aka Maria KoszuCKa (1876–1939?): Polish communist activist, one of the founders of the KPP; member of the CK KPP. She emigrated to USSR in 1930; represented the KPP in the Executive Committee of ComIntern. She was arrested in 1937 and executed in 1939.

[130]   Antoni Krajewski, aka Władysław Stein (1886–1937): Polish communist politician. He was a member of the Bureau of the International Control Commission and served as Head of the IKKI Press Department. He was arrested and executed in 1937.

[131]   Jerzy SochacCKi-Bratkowski, aka Czeszejko-Sochcki (1892–1933): Polish communist politician; member of the PPS and KPP. He was a candidate for membership in the Presidium of ComIntern. He was arrested in 1933 and died in prison the same year.

[132]   Edward Próchniak (1888–1937): Polish communist. In 1921–1937, he served as a representative and executive of the KPP in ComIntern. In 1936–1937, he was a member of the KPP Politburo abroad. He was arrested on 8 July 1937; sentenced and executed on 21 August 1937.

[133]   Viktor Bertynskij, aka Žytlovskij; (1900–1937): Soviet-Polish communist activist of Jewish origin; member of the VKP(b). He emigrated to the USSR in 1924. He served on the Executive Committee of ComIntern and the Special Department of the OGPU in Moscow. He was arrested and executed in 1937.

[134]   The spelling is how it appears in the document. The correct name is Nauiokaytis.

[135]   Jan Paszyn, aka Bielewski (1892–1937): Polish communist. He served as a representative of the KPP in the Executive Committee of ComIntern. He was arrested and executed in 1937.

[136]   Henryk Gustav Lauer (1890–1937): Polish mathematician and communist activist of Jewish origin. He was Head of the Department for Mining and Metallurgy of GosPlan. He was arrested and executed in 1937.

[137]   Mirosław Zdziarski, aka Wojtkiewicz (1892–1937): Polish communist activist. He worked as a scientific researcher at the Institute of World Economy and World Politics. He was arrested and executed in 1937.

[138]   The spelling is how it appears in the document. The correct name is Abram Genrikovskij (1904–1937): Soviet-Polish journalist of Jewish origin, not party-affiliated. He worked as a proofreader for the newspaper Trybuna Radziecka. He was arrested and executed in 1937.

[139]   Independent peasants party, a radical left-wing Polish people’s party founded in 1924 by a group of PSL “Wyzwolenie” deputies. In 1927, it was dissolved by the Minister of Internal Affairs.

[140]   Sylwester Wojewódzki (1892–1938): Polish communist and military man. In 1931, he emigrated to the USSR. He was arrested in 1931. In 1933, he was sentenced to ten years of imprisonment. He was detained at the Yaroslavl political isolator. He was arrested again and executed in 1938

[141]   Jan Klys (1896–1938): Soviet functionary of Polish origin. He was the Director of the Stackovskoj Machine and Tractor Station (MTS). He was arrested in 1937 and executed in 1938.

[142]   Aleksandr Červjakov (1892–1937): Soviet communist of Belarusian origin; member of the VKP(b). He served as the BSSR representative to the Central Executive Committee (TsIK); later, Chairman of the TsIK BSSR. He committed suicide in 1937.

[143]   Nikolaj Goloded (1894–1937): Soviet statesman of Belarusian origin; member of the VKP(b). He served as Chairman of the BSSR Council of People’s Commissars (SovNarKom). He was a member of the Bureau CK VKP(b) of BSSR and a candidate for membership in CK VKP(b). He was arrested in 1937; later the same year, he committed suicide.

[144]   The correct name is the Second Department.

[145]   Ieronim Uborevič (1896–1937): Soviet military of Lithuanian origin; member of the VKP(b). He served as the Commander of the troops of the Belarusian Military District and held the rank of the Army General. He was arrested and executed in 1937.

[146]   Grigorii Zinoviev, aka Geršon-Radomyslʹskij (1883–1936): Soviet politician and official of Jewish origin. In Organizational Bureau of the CK RKP(b). In 1934, he was arrested and sentenced to ten years in prison. 1936, he was sentenced to the ultimate punishment and was executed the same year.

[147]   Sergej Hessen (1898–1937): Soviet functionary of Jewish origin; member of the VKP(b). He served as an authorized representative of the NarKomTiazhProm of the USSR for the Western Region. He was arrested in 1934. In 1935, he was sentenced to six years of imprisonment. He was arrested again in 1936 and executed in 1937.

[148]   Kliment Vorošilov (1881–1969): Soviet military man and politician; member of the VKP(b). In 1926–1952, he was a member of the Politburo CK VKP(b). In 1934–1940, he served as the People’s Commissar of Defense of the USSR and held the rank of Marshal. He was never held responsible for his involvement in the purges.

[149]   Wiktor Stasiak, aka Bronisław Berman (1903–1943): Polish communist activist; member of the IKKI. He was arrested in 1935 and detained by the Special Corps of the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR. In 1936, he was sentenced to ten years of labor camps. Died in Usolsk ITL.

[150]   Juzef Koneckij, aka Leon Rozin (1900–?): Soviet communist activist of Jewish origin; member of the
KP(b)U; member of the Executive Committee of the Young Communist International. He was Deputy Head of the Culture and Propaganda Department (KultProp) of the CK KP(b)U. He was arrested in 1935 and detained by the Special Corps of the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR.

[151]   The following individuals were involved in the group criminal case: Józef Konecki (Juzef Koneckij); Wiktor Stasiak; Janusz Sosnowicz, aka Ignacy Tom (1902–1938?), senior editor of the newspaper Sierp; Stefan Rybnicki, aka Skrzydlewski (1901–1938?), Head of the Editorial Board of Sierp; Michał Gruda, aka Emil Demke (1902–1964?), Head of the Industrial Department of Sierp.

[152]   Nikolai Iezhov (1895–1940): communist party official and secret police officer. In 1936, he started serving in the State Security agencies. In 1936–1938, he was Narkom of the Internal Affairs of the USSR (NKVD). In 1938–1939, he served as the People’s Commissar of Water Transport. In 1935–1939, he was Secretary of the CK VKP(b). In 1937–1939, he was also a candidate for membership in the Politburo CK VKP(b). He was one of the top organizers and active participants in the implementation of the Great Terror. He was arrested in 1939 and executed in 1940.

[153]   Voldemar Ulmer (1896–1945): Soviet functionary of Swedish origin. In 1938, he was Head of the Secretariat of First Deputy NarKom of Internal Affairs. He was arrested in 1939 and sentenced to 15 years of labor camps. He died in detention.

Author:Maciej Wyrwa